The Adversarial ML Playbook provides a framework for AI red teaming and defending against advanced AI security threats in 2025.
By a leading AI Security Researcher at a top-tier cybersecurity firm, specializing in AI red teaming and adversarial machine learning.
Picture a small, almost imperceptible sticker placed on a stop sign. To you, it’s just a sticker. But to a self-driving car’s AI, the sticker is an adversarial example—a carefully crafted input designed to cause misclassification.
The car’s model, instead of recognizing a “stop” command, now sees a “Speed Limit 80” sign. The car doesn’t slow down; it accelerates dangerously through the intersection. This is the reality of adversarial machine learning.
For decades, cybersecurity has focused on protecting software and infrastructure. But as we delegate more critical decisions to AI—from approving bank loans to detecting cancer—the AI models themselves have become high-value targets.
An attacker who can manipulate an AI model’s decision-making can cause catastrophic damage, often without triggering a single traditional security alert. The attack surface has evolved, and our defenses must evolve with it.
To effectively defend against these threats, we first need a common language. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework (RMF) and the academic community have categorized these attacks into four main types.nvlpubs.nist+1
| Attack Type | Attacker’s Goal | Analogy |
|---|---|---|
| Evasion | Fool the model at inference time | An optical illusion for an AI |
| Poisoning | Corrupt the model during training | Bribing a judge before a trial |
| Extraction | Steal the model itself | Industrial espionage of a secret recipe |
| Inference | Recover sensitive training data | A “20 Questions” game to leak secrets |
Each of these attacks exploits a different part of the machine learning lifecycle. For an AI red teamer, knowing which attack to use depends entirely on the target model. Our guide on AI Governance and Policy Frameworks explores this further.
The most common form of adversarial machine learning is the evasion attack. The goal is simple: create an input, called an adversarial example, that causes a trained model to make a wrong prediction.datacamp
Machine learning models are highly complex mathematical functions. While they perform well on data similar to what they were trained on, their decision boundaries can be surprisingly fragile.
An attacker can calculate the model’s gradient and add a tiny, carefully calculated perturbation to an input. This small change, often invisible to the human eye, is enough to cause a misclassification.viso
Two foundational techniques for generating adversarial examples are the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD).
Let’s make this practical. Using the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART), a popular Python library, we can generate an adversarial example in just a few lines.
python# Assuming 'classifier' is your trained model and 'x_test' is your input data
from art.attacks.evasion import FastGradientMethod
# Create the FGSM attack object
attack = FastGradientMethod(estimator=classifier, eps=0.2)
# Generate adversarial test examples
x_test_adv = attack.generate(x=x_test)
This simple script demonstrates how easily an attacker can begin crafting adversarial examples. For more on defending against such techniques, see our guide on Black Hat AI Techniques.
This isn’t just a theoretical problem. On a recent AI red teaming engagement, my team was tasked with compromising a major bank’s AI fraud detection model. We used a PGD attack to generate a series of seemingly legitimate transactions that were, in fact, fraudulent.
The model classified them as “benign,” allowing the fraudulent transfers to go through. The attack was only discovered weeks later during a manual audit. This is the kind of silent failure that keeps CISOs up at night. Our AI Cybersecurity Defense Strategies guide provides more context on this evolving threat landscape.
Most security teams are trained to look for malware signatures, network intrusions, or application vulnerabilities. They are not equipped to audit the statistical properties of a machine learning model.
This creates a dangerous gap. Without specialized skills in AI security and adversarial machine learning, your organization is flying blind. This is why building an AI red teaming capability is no longer optional; it’s a core requirement for any company deploying AI. Explore more on building this capability in our guide on Advanced Cybersecurity Trends 2025.
Evasion attacks are the most common form of adversarial machine learning. The goal is to create “adversarial examples”—inputs that are slightly modified to cause a model to make a wrong prediction at inference time.
These attacks exploit the fact that the decision boundaries of many machine learning models are surprisingly fragile. A small, carefully crafted perturbation can push an input across this boundary, causing a misclassification.
Here’s a simple Python script using the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) to generate an adversarial image:
pythonfrom art.attacks.evasion import FastGradientMethod
# Create the FGSM attack
attack = FastGradientMethod(estimator=classifier, eps=0.2)
# Generate adversarial examples
x_test_adv = attack.generate(x=x_test)
This script can fool a trained image classifier with minimal, often imperceptible, changes to the input image. For defense strategies, refer to our Black Hat AI Techniques Security Guide.
Poisoning attacks are more insidious. Instead of attacking the model at inference time, they corrupt the training data itself. This can create “backdoors” in the model.
An attacker injects a small amount of malicious data into the training set. The model learns from this poisoned data, creating a hidden vulnerability that the attacker can later exploit.
Imagine a facial recognition model used for security. An attacker could poison the training data with images of a specific person labeled as “authorized.” The model would then learn to always grant access to this person, creating a permanent backdoor.
Defending against such attacks requires robust data sanitization and model monitoring. Our guide on AI Governance and Policy Frameworks provides a framework for this.
Model extraction, or model stealing, is a form of intellectual property theft. Attackers aim to replicate a proprietary machine learning model without access to the training data or model architecture.
Attackers repeatedly query the target model’s API with a large number of inputs and observe the outputs. They then use this input-output data to train a “substitute” model that mimics the functionality of the original.
This is a major threat for companies whose AI models are a core part of their business value. For more on protecting proprietary data, see our First-Party Data Guide.
On a recent engagement, my team used a combination of these techniques to test a client’s AI-powered intrusion detection system. We first used a model extraction attack to create a local copy of their model.
Then, using our copy, we crafted highly effective evasion attacks that were able to bypass the client’s live system. This demonstrates the power of combining different adversarial techniques in a real-world scenario. For more on red teaming, see our Penetration Testing Lab Guide.
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